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CREEDAL STATEMENT AND THE MODERN SPIRIT

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There are many men today who by reason of material circumstance on the one hand and intellectual sympathy on the other find themselves related to two worlds—the world of action, of social and material interest, of struggle for the new democracy and for better economic conditions, and the world of religious and theological thinking. And to such men it perchance often seems that these two worlds, coexisting in time, are little related, indeed totally unrelated, or, if related, somewhat hostile. Though the unity of modern life seems to be its dominant fact, yet in actual experience a man may find himself at one time or another in environments which seem to be almost unrelated one to the other. If one have the sympathy of the scholar or of the churchman he may feel how intense and concentrated are the interests and the thoughts of those about him upon the problems of history, philosophy, and theology, or upon the sentiments inspired by a religious meeting or by an ecclesiastical convention. While he stays in this environment the ideas and forces which inspire and constitute it seem all important and all imperious; he may perhaps dimly hear the clang and clamor of the other world's machinery, the passion of the struggle for existence, the insistent and seemingly warranted demands for action which is practical and dictated by the exigencies of the present; he may feel the impatience of that outer world with the ideas and sympathies which for the time control him: but he feels himself in good company; he knows that he stands with a body of men whose thoughts are all the more likely to be true because they are not "practical," because they do not terminate in the immediate and unrelated activities of the present. The aristocracy of unselfish scholarship satisfies him; the intellectual grandeur of the men with whom he is for the time being associated inspires him; or that no less insidious and positive aristocracy of religious sympathy makes him content to be with the minority, if it be a minority. The spacious emotions of

scholarly or religious association are all imperious, and they come with full force to those to whom they come at all. The satisfactions of an accepted minority, or of martyrdom if need be, are ultimate in their appealing power to many men. But if one be not confined either to the realm of scholarship or of the church, because he is not a scholar or because he is compelled by the bread-and-butter necessity to live a part of his life in the outer world, the world of present men and things, the world of passion and struggle, he then feels how remote from the compelling necessities of his life are those other things which he would probably choose to be the all-controlling, as they would be the all-satisfying, forces of his life, if he could.

To state all this more baldly, the situation exists in the world today, that a body of theological scholars and thinkers, and a larger body of adherents to the church of Jesus Christ, are actuated by intellectual considerations, feel emotions, and take positions which have almost no influence upon that great public mind and interest which control modern life in America. A wise and accurate observer said to the writer recently that the church, her thought, and her attitude are of no real interest today to the public mind; that apart from a very small contingent of readers, theological and religious books have no commercial value. The same man, be it said further, went on to express the opinion that if the church were really to be united in the taking of a positive attitude upon any great question she would exercise an overwhelming influence upon the public mind. The former opinion above quoted is in the judgment of the writer altogether too strong; but it still remains true that theological and religious ideas and interests, particularly those formulated in the creeds, are apart from the common and main interests of human life, and have very little effect upon the thoughts and activities of the public mind and will. Notwithstanding the fact that there has been within a few years a renaissance of sympathies and activities which careful observers believe to have a religious inspiration, they are still largely unrelated to the church, and many of them deliberately exclude both the church and all forms of confessional religion. The successful forms of philanthropic and social activity today deliberately eliminate the church as church, and confessional religion as confessional religion from their administrative work. Instead of religion being the great principle

and force for unity as we should suppose it ought to be, men find larger and more inclusive unities in other things. The Charity-Organization Society, for example, would go on to the rocks if it admitted the finest point of the wedge of ecclesiastical determination into its activities; so would the great settlements and the various societies for the promotion of the gospel of humanized and moralized economics. The very church herself, when she becomes institutional and seeks the material, economic, and social betterment of mankind as a whole, keeps her own confessional religion out of her institutional activities. In other words, there is a chasm like the chasm between the races in the south between creedal religion and those practical, social, and moral activities which so largely make up modern life, and even between creedal religion and many of those social and moral activities which are supposed to and do issue from the religious spirit.

This chasm is due to a number of causes, but perhaps the primary cause is the estrangement between science and corporate life, the great motive forces by which corporate life is governed and upheld, being in flux. The fact is that religious creeds are scientific in their character and that even religious emotions, when formulated, become scientific. Science is essentially an *ex post-facto* result. It consists in a formalized statement of deduction from events, forces, or motives which have already happened or have worked themselves out into the existence of the world or the life of mankind. The main content of science is the intellectual statement of that which has been, and it is only the specialist who has either the time or the interest to study what has been and to formulate the laws and principles deduced from the actual processes under observation. Theology or the science of religion does not differ either in its make-up or in its limitations from other forms of science. There is and can be no religious experience without formulation of the methods and principles by which it is apprehended and of the knowledge of self, God, and the world which results from it; but that formulation is subsequent in consciousness to the experience of which it is the science. The creeds in their present form are the formulation of the principles and laws of past religious experience.

Another cause, involved in the foregoing, is the specialization of function rendered necessary by the immense complexity and manifold-

ness of life in the modern world. He who is doing the world's actual work today under the stress of its infinitely intricate and multitudinous compulsions has little time for the acquiring of any knowledge of the past which does not come to him incidentally and implicitly in the necessities of the present; and if it be possible that a great scholar could devote his whole life to the study of the Greek particle *ἀν*, surely the man who attempts to know the history of Christian thought and the deductions from Christian experience in the past must be a specialist. If a scholar have a peculiar order of mind, his knowledge of the past will involve, just as the knowledge of any science involves, certain implications as to its present and its future; and one of his functions must be to make clear to the man of action and the man of present experience what are those principles and deductions from past life which have probable pertinence for the guidance of the present and the future. But most scholars, like most practical workers, tend to limit both their knowledge and their interests to that with which they are primarily concerned. Consequently there are an arbitrary specialization of function, a vicious antithesis between the present and the past, and an over-weening impatience characteristic of the present time with the deductions from previous history and experience. Indeed, this impatience, though not peculiar to this age, is nevertheless greatly accentuated by our consciousness of an unexampled advance in knowledge and ideas. It is natural for the men of any generation and in any department of life to feel that the exigencies of present life are supreme and self-illumining; but this feeling is especially strong today in all departments of life. One of the faults of current politics is that the men actively engaged in conducting the political affairs of men are either uninformed or impatient of those fundamental laws of human life and activity according to which the affairs of men have thus far evolved. The present seems to most men so infinitely more important than the past or the future that they are impatient at the introductions of comparisons which seem to reflect upon their present judgment and knowledge, or at anticipations which would check their immediate procedure. They forget that every step of the world has been taken in accordance with a living urgent imperative lying at the very heart of human nature and from which human nature can at no

time separate itself. But though this tendency exists in civic and political administration it exists to a vastly greater degree in the religious thinking and acting of men. There are a self-sufficiency and self-centeredness in the popular religious thinking of this age, a belief that this is the only real scene in the world's great drama of religious life, which cut the bond of connection with the past more nearly completely than in any other department of life or of activity. Since we have discovered that past ages of religious thinking have been held by slavish subserviency to a past further back, and by the supposition that God has not spoken since the first century of the Christian era, we have reacted from that slavish subserviency and supposition to the extreme opposite supposition that God has never spoken until now, and that the compelling spiritual dictates of the age in which we live are the first and only voice of the Living God.

Still another cause, lying deeper than the others, may be said to be psychological. Various ages of the world have been governed, not by the working of the human spirit as a compound whole, but by the working of one or another function of the human spirit. This seems to have been a law of human progress. The only exception to it as a general historical law is the operation of the Greek spirit, which was characterized by a compoundness, a proportion, and balanced interplay of human faculties such as the world has never elsewhere seen. That was possible because of the rather defined limits within which the Greek spirit operated. The Greeks had a definite ideal of perfection as evidenced in their architecture, in the plastic arts, and in their cultivation of a perfect physical manhood; and to the realization of that ideal of perfection they applied the three faculties of the human spirit, thinking, feeling, and willing. Their literature, their art, their politics, and their ethics are correlated with a beautiful proportion such as was possible in view of their limited conception of perfection. Furthermore, they were under no necessity for bringing the human democracy up to their ideal. Their democracy was a rigidly selected aristocracy and did not involve the realization of the ideal by humanity but only by a few. With the introduction by Christianity of the new ideal of humanity, and with the later introduction of the Gothic philosophy of necessary imperfection, the Greek ideal of harmony became impossible. We can never again have

on this earth a comprehensive philosophy of life, or even of art or literature, such as the Greeks had, because the idea of an infinite God must always mean evolution and hence mean imperfection for humanity. By this deeper specialization of function human thinking and progress have been characterized since the advent of Christianity and the Goths into civilization. Subsequent ages have been dominated by one or another faculty of the human spirit. Whereas in the city states of Greece, and in the earlier days of Rome, religion, morals, culture, and political duty were linked in a gracious unity and harmony; in the later days of Rome, from the time of Seneca on, corporate life underwent a momentous change. Morals were separated from art and from politics; and henceforth the great problem of life, was how to make character self-sufficing and independent, how to find the beatitude of man in the autonomous will. The individual was thrown upon himself for the realization of his own destiny, and that destiny was projected upon the battlefield of the world, his own destiny, yet a part of that of a common humanity.¹ The Italian Renaissance, accompanied by a development of conditions which absorbed the whole life of the people within small compass, was naturally a reign of feeling: and it was a wonderful civilization, that of the free cities; because in it first, through the feelings induced or stimulated by near and tense associations, by corporate national consciousness, by the evolution of the popular language, and by comparative peace and wealth, the resurrection of the free spirit of humanity came to pass. The revival of learning; the discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo, of Vesalius and Harvey; and the advent of the great theologians, Augustine, Anselm, and Calvin, resulted in the dominance of the intellect.

We are now again in an age of the will, when men see not the future, neither reason concerning it, but live under the necessity of action. The Master seems to have recognized, or illustrated, the limitation of human power and the necessity of differentiation of function, which have so clearly characterized human history, when He said "he that doeth truth cometh to the light." There are times in the lives of men and the lives of races when they must act without knowledge or without feeling, when they must depend upon the result of their

¹ Cf. Dill, *Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius*.

acting for the intellectual illuminining and emotional inspiring of possible further acting. The time in which we are living seems to be peculiarly such a time. The very intricacy and manifoldness of the motives and forces which impel men, render action of some sort necessary when neither foresight nor the illumination of intellectual inference is possible.

Perhaps it would be more nearly accurate to say of our time, and particularly of our country, that the feeling and the will are the master faculties in operation; for many of the great problems of modern life result from the blind and unconscious passions and the partially reasoned desires of men. But that the intellect is in a measure in abeyance, clear and far-sighted reason largely impossible, is almost beyond question. Let us look for a moment at the complex and turbulent condition of the affairs of men in our modern world. Business and commercial life has developed, by reason of the master passion for gain and as a result of fertility of invention, itself partly the result of the passion for gain, into such a maze of intricacies and with such violent rapidity, that the slower-footed intellect has had no time either to analyze the condition of that life or formulate the ethical principles by which it should be regulated and guided. It would be well, by the way, for students of business ethics, especially for those who sit in the seats of scornful judgment and would destroy the whole economic system which the centuries have developed, to remember that the ethical consciousness of mankind rather follows in the wake of activity than precedes it. The function of that consciousness is to judge what is, rather than to determine what shall be. And when action is forced and vehement as it is today, the wisdom which determines its ethical values is likely to be far behind. The hypothesis of ignorance as the cause of many modern evils, instead of malicious wickedness, is not only much the more charitable hypothesis, but much the truer to human psychology and to fact. And look again at the number and variety of new adjustments men have been obliged to make by reason of the reduction in the size of the earth and the consequent new and violent juxtaposition of races widely divergent in sympathies and ideas, which science and invention have involved. A vast flood of new aspirations, new motives, new forces and capacities has been let loose into life as science has tapped both the spirit

of man and the pent-up wealth of the earth; and we are in a battle of will with the social forces of centuries as well as with the newly discovered energies, the vehement aspirations, and the confused ideas of a new epoch. We have again something of that feeling men had in France during the Revolution, that they had only to will the freedom and happiness of the world, and all nature and society would be plastic to daring and vigorous action. Notwithstanding the historical tendencies of scholarship, the popular feeling and will of our day are animated by the same kind of passion with which Byron's hero was animated—that for the unconditioned life, a life uninformed by the long chronicle of the manifold experiences of humanity and without that sane social and spiritual faith which issues from the consciousness of slow evolution of character and of condition.

If we are right in this analysis of the disposition of the times we must conclude that the attitude of the modern spirit toward creedal religion involves no real question of the truth of the creeds, certainly no proof of their untruth, but only at most of their immediate relevance to the practical issues of modern life. The present situation is the result of fault on both sides. The church has arrogantly held not only to ancient formularies but to ancient and temporary interpretations, declining to reinterpret her formularies either into their universal (so far as that might be possible) significance or into the immediate and intelligible significances of present-day life; and the modern spirit has with equal arrogance assumed universal and eternal truthfulness for both its mode of apprehending life and the immediate issues of the age. The ideals of scholarship and organized religion lack penetrating and infusive power, and the modern-time spirit and the resultant economic and social organism lack translucence and permeability. An illustration of the lack of sociability and sympathy of which we are speaking may be found in the failure of the popular mind to apprehend the extraordinary change which has come to pass in the attitude of scientific men toward the ideals of religion. Twenty years ago there was hardly one among the leaders of science who gave any positive sympathy to the forces of historic and organized religion. The line of intellectual attack upon church and organized religion was strong and active. Today the situation is entirely different: not because the church did mighty and truthful battle, and so broke

the line, but because it broke itself and fell away. As against the almost uniform attitude of the great scientists of twenty years ago many of the most eminent scientists are today giving positive sympathy and help to the forces of religion. And yet popular indifference and scepticism are not lessened but seem rather to be increasing, or at least to be more pronounced now than twenty years ago. In other words the strictly intellectual movements of our time, as they terminate upon or affect theological issues, have not been apprehended by the popular mind, and have had no appreciable influence upon the popular judgment. It is only the spectacular and emotional results of science which reach the time-spirit and determine its feeling and acting. The imperious needs of our day are sympathy and sociability for our ideas and the intellectualizing of our feeling and willing processes.

It is a "large contract" and possibly smacking of the pedantry of old attempts to reconcile science and religion, as well as promising the same fruitlessness, to venture an attempt at relating the creeds to the modern spirit; but perhaps such a venture may be considered less presumptuous and safer by reason of the fact that it has not to deal with conflicts of science and theological dogma or with disputed questions of scholarship. Indeed it is not intended to deal with intellectual issues at all; for the antagonism, if antagonism it be, between creedal religion and the modern spirit, the skepticism of our day, is not intellectual but moral, having its roots neither in science nor reason but in the passions and the wills of men. It is one of the evidences of that estrangement between science and corporate life of which we have been speaking. We have declared it to be a *moral* skepticism which holds the popular mind aloof from the church and organized religion, by which is meant a skepticism inspired by the popular philosophy of pragmatism. Pragmatism, though it now has the support of many of the most eminent philosophic minds of our time is not and never has been a generic product of the schools. It is the simple and largely unreasoned philosophy of an energetic will, and is natural to an age laying pre-eminent stress upon a definitely willed activity which results in fruits, consequences, and facts. It may be refined or exalted into humanism and treated with the subtle acumen of Schiller or with the logical accuracy of Dewey, or again, under its

own name, with the "conceptual short cuts"—the brilliant appositeness and beautiful lucidity of James; but it is primarily the philosophy of the practical man. Of course in the treatment of the school philosophers, it gets a wider and deeper meaning, and becomes, as James says, "a theory of truth;" but it is originally and generically a theory of practice, or rather a canon of result. It is a kind of combination pocketknife with which knots are cut, bottles uncorked, and all sorts of jobs are done. Yet it is not an ignoble system of thought, and it is vastly to the credit of an unphilosophical age that it has, and believes so profoundly as does our age in, such a philosophy. It is empiricist in its attitudes and has a strong tinge of the utilitarian in its make-up; but it is profoundly moral as well as practical and finds its highest and finest uses and its noblest results in ethics. It is no mere criterion of commerce or industrial efficiency, but is the natural philosophy of a mighty conscience and of a profound religious insight. It lay deep in the soul of Jesus and sprang from his lips in such a saying as, "By their fruits ye shall know them." That philosophy as a moral passion and as a canon of religious efficiency is at the root of modern skepticism as to church and creedal religion, not the demand for a new theology or the scientific and intellectual disproof of the creeds. And contrary to a widespread impression it is not primarily intellectual difficulty which keeps young men of the better sort out of the ministry today, but the conviction that the possibilities of highest social and moral efficiency lie in other fields of service. Whatever the faults, and they are many, of the time-spirit, its skepticism has a root of eternal good, in that it insists that organized religion shall have great vital convictions respecting the social and economic conditions which affect and largely determine character, that it be self-critical and self-revisionary, and, more than all, that it find and give eternal significance to those ideals and motive forces which are the urgent imperatives in the heart and activities of the modern world. The very ground and sources of honest skepticism are the utterances of that mysterious voice of the present in whose wind-swept strains we hear the deep-toned yearnings of a spirit which is not modern for a vaster and richer life for the whole great family of man. In other words modern skepticism has in it the virtue of vigorous reaction from that ignoble and pliant optimism and lazy patience which accepts meticulous intention

in lieu of an efficiency and achievement proportionate to opportunity.

There is indeed a skepticism obtaining today which is not noble, but is the ingeniously reticulated pretense of a bare and groveling selfishness; the willed faithlessness of a smart society supported by private and public gambling, the level of whose intellectual attainments rarely rises above bridge-whist, whose aesthetic inspirations culminate in flowers and fruits out of season, and whose whole conception of pleasure is the incessant ministrations to its own erotic sensibilities. But this skepticism is not serious to any but its holders, and will disappear as soon as the rising democracy shall have flung the parasites generated by a vicious economic system from its neck. And there is still another skepticism, nobler than that just mentioned, yet not fundamental either in origin or effect. It arises from mistaken and partial economic theories, or from passionate bitterness and unreasoning impatience that the church does not do the impossible. It forgets that the catholicity which is the most precious ideal of organized religion is as surely forfeited if it becomes the unrighteous or untruthful partizan of the impassioned ignorance and unreasoned demands of the poor as when it becomes the exponent of the vested interests of the rich. Religion being neither science nor art, but life, must not commit itself to partial and unproven theories of life; it must adhere to the great fact that the exercise of life precedes the knowledge of life. The church may well afford to be patient with this skepticism because it is one which time and the increase of knowledge will outgrow; but it is nevertheless important that those forces which have assumed charge of organized religion should be distinctly and vividly conscious of life. It is because the church seems careless of life and identified with that economic system which bases wealth and demands profit upon material capital rather than upon the human life involved that any skepticism is serious. The passionate revolt of the new democracy against the existing social order, including the church, is because of the subordination of the human interests—life, health, character, and pleasure—to profits upon machinery, government privilege, unearned land, and the money value assigned to stocks and bonds. It is not and cannot be the business of organized religion to propound economic theories, but it is its business to emphasize human life and its essential interests as the basic wealth of the

world, and the securing of those interests as the primal condition of income for the less important forms of wealth. Mr. E. M. Shepard, in a remarkably lucid paper, has advocated a plan of capitalization in which the shares shall not have arbitrarily assigned money value, but shall simply be units whose value shall be determined by profits. He thinks such a plan would do away with much of the temptation to which managers succumb to realize profits upon previously assigned values. That is a step in the right direction, but one surely cannot be mistaken in the belief that real and essential religion dictates an economic system whose fixed and all-conditioning canon of valuation and profit shall be the human life which is involved therein.

We have however turned a little aside from our immediate problem, the creeds and the modern spirit; and in coming back to it we may perhaps rejoice that we have to deal with the original creeds rather than with current custom. Christian practice, or rather the practice of the church, has, as have all human developments, varied from the strict method and process of evolution from germinal principles. In the development of human institutions accretion as well as evolution plays a part, and the church and theology have not been exempt from the accretive process. There is much in the practice and thought of the modern church and in the accepted theology which is neither implied in nor evolved from the creeds, indeed much which nullifies creedal principles; and the very skepticism of the modern spirit, instead of contravening the germinal principles of religion, derives a large part of its force for the popular mind from its appeal to those principles. Whatever else the "modern spirit" may mean, it certainly means a deep-breathed and imperious demand for the democratization of the goods of life, including religion. In other words it demands that life and its interests be the primary concern of religion and church. Hence the canon of creedal appeal must be the canon of democratized life. Our intellectual problem, and our moral problem as well, is to get back to first principles and ascertain what they are. A steady head and calm courage are the needs of the hour if we are not to forfeit much of the beneficent heritage of history.

Let us therefore consider a few of the great affirmations of the creeds and see what social significance they have; or, rather, let us consider some of the fundamental moments in the modern spirit and

see whether the great affirmation of the creeds have a moral and spiritual relevance which should entitle them to the attention of those earnest men outside the church who are contributing so much of the social idealism in modern life. And the first of those moments, the fundamental principle and inspiration of our new social idealism, is the brotherhood of man. To it the creeds apply the more fundamental and the conditioning doctrine of the fatherhood of God. We need not enter here into the question as to whether or not the theological doctrine is not historically causal to the social doctrine. For the sake of a generous courtesy, which theology can well afford, we need only to take the social doctrine as if it were an independent and modern product of evolution; but logically and *per essentiam* the brotherhood of man is and must be conditioned upon and derived from the fatherhood of God. Human society, to be sure, is coming rapidly to the consciousness that altruism is a scientific necessity, that individual health depends upon the health of the community, and that the individual's power and success are realized only through beneficent social relationships; but that spiritual fraternity of mankind, which is both deeper and higher in the ranges of its feeling and activity than enlightened self-interest can ever sound or realize, is just as logically and just as essentially derived from the consciousness of the paternity of God as is the fraternity of children in a single family from the consciousness of a common father and mother. The natural fraternity of man without the consciousness of God as father would be no more powerful and no surer in its inclusive application and effect than would be the fraternity of orphans, suggested by the walls surrounding them all or by the superintendent to whom they owed a common obedience. It would be at best the chance fraternity of an *esprit de corps* or of a common convenience, and would be as definitely characterized by its exclusions as by its preferences. Man's common descent from God is the basis and the vitalizing force of brotherhood in himself.

That is so simple and so profoundly pragmatic a proposition that it needs no further argument; and we may accordingly proceed to the next moment in the modern spirit, the demand for the service of love as the true life of the individual. The creeds respond with the declaration that God holds himself also subject to that law, and

that to fulfil his obedience to it he gave himself in Jesus Christ to a life of deathless love and infinite service. At its best and deepest the life of Jesus Christ means that the very divinity of God is wrought in the service of a love which knows no limit of sacrifice. Say what we will of the mystery surrounding his life and character, whether we think that mystery original and coming with him to earth or exhaled like a mist from men's subsequent theorizing about him, the cardinal and elemental significance of Jesus Christ is that he is conscious of revealing the person and character of God. It is as if he would say with life what Browning said with words:

What lacks, then, of perfection fit for God
But just the instance which this tale supplies
Of love without a limit? So is strength,
So is intelligence; let love be so
Unlimited in its self-sacrifice,
Then is the tale true and God shows complete.

In the Synoptists, as clearly as in John, Jesus claims a unique knowledge of God, which knowledge he endeavors to give to men; and the God whom he reveals is one whose love is not and could not be confined to the Jews, but is universal both as a sentiment and as an activity. And furthermore Jesus derives from this thought of God his own sense of communion and the criterion of his value to the life of men. The will of God is love, righteousness, service; he must do that will; it is his meat and drink; hence he must serve, and that service must end in his giving his very life as a ransom for many. But it was not only a part, though the main part, of Christ's conception of his mission that he revealed God; he also conceives of himself as revealing man, the common element in both revelations being love. Rather love in man is a derivation or reproduction of love in God. Because God's life consists in loving, so man's life consists in loving; and man's ideal is to be perfect as God is, i. e., to love as God loves. The modern ideal of social service is not merely responded to in the creeds, but it is infinitely deepened, given a deathless value, and grounded in the nature of God who is the Father of man.

And that brings us to another moment in the modern spirit. The true ideal of social service which gives a driving enthusiasm to our best life is not one merely of concrete activity; it is a matter of life

as well as action. Society is more than a family with family sentiments and reciprocal duties, it is an organism, with a social consciousness and feeling as well as social obligations. It has the essential qualities of a vital organism. To that conception the creeds respond with the doctrine of the Trinity. And here we enter a province of definition and thinking wherein we may easily lose touch with the mental and even with the emotional interests of modern life. Yet what is the doctrine of the Trinity but a socializing of the being of God, a declaration that social differentiation and social interests do not have to be acquired or theoretically cognized by God, but are inherent in him? The doctrine of the Trinity is the profoundest religious expression of the social idea. It preserves the religious value of polytheism and pantheism, both of which are social symbols for God; but keeps the unity and single nature of monotheism. It predicates an internally differentiated unity in God, internal satisfaction and pleasures, and joy in his own company. If the creeds could interpret themselves they would say that society is more than a family because God is more than a father; it is an organism because he is an organism. He can love men naturally and be to them more than an adoptive or artificial father because he loves and is a father in himself.

The creedal doctrines of the Ascension and of the Holy Spirit are the great religious expressions of the democracy of God, the first instances of the socialization and universalization of personal power and spiritual force. The creedal doctrine of eternal life is the corollary, or rather the primal expression, of the modern emphasis upon the value of life as life, not as condition or circumstance. Our modern thought of eternalness of life as one of value, not of time or condition, is not new. It is the very essence of Jesus' thought and of the creedal doctrine; and it was lost to the church for so many years only because to the majority of the early Christians, and indeed to humble Christians for generations, the world did not offer life but only existence. Therefore, when they thought of life and believed in the promise of life they referred both their thought and their belief to the future. To be sure they did not fully realize what Jesus meant and they did not perhaps apply themselves with such intelligent will and energy to the task of transforming existence into life as they might have done;

but the meaning of Jesus' teaching as to life is for us clear and explicit, as is also that thought of it which lies at the basis of the Catholic creeds. Even the doctrine of punishment which is not creedal, and the arbitrary and exaggerated statements of which have caused so radical a revolt in this humarer day, is only theological phrase for that eternal law upon which the modern spirit places new emphasis, that character is destiny, that that which has been can never be as if it had not been, that what a man does or fails to do of good or of evil registers itself indelibly and permanently in his character and life.

Enough has been said to indicate what is in mind, without further details or arguments; and if enough has been said to stimulate increased caution and larger consideration and appreciation in both churchmen and modernists, and also to show a possible *modus cogitandi et vivendi* through which may be realized in our imperious and urgent modern life what Bossuet so finely calls "the sequence of the counsels of God" as the order of progress the writer will gladly leave to wiser men the fuller preparation for that

far-off divine event
To which the whole creation moves.